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Internet Management: On Stage, and Backstage

Remark: the following news article refers to weibo (微博), or weiboke (微博客). This doesn’t necessarily confine the set of rules in question to Sina.com‘s Weibo, but to all kinds of microblogs, as Weibo simply means “microblog”, and any microblog platform other than Sina.com’s Weibo would be a “weibo” in Chinese, too. Besides, it seems unlikely that a set of legislation or rules would single out just one provider. I’ll therefore translate weibo as microblogs in the following paragraphs — JR

[Update, Dec 16: while these rules seem to apply only for the Beijing metropolitan area, a BBC report suggests that they will affect all providers registered in Beijing - this would include Sina and Sohu. One could argue that this effectively turns the "Beijing city government's regulations" into national regulations.]

China National Radio (CNR) Net, Beijing, December 16, 2011 – Beijing city government has announced the implementation of “Beijing City Microblog Development Management and other regulations”, saying that any organization or individual who registers an account with microblogs must provide information about his or her real identity, and websites that run microblogs must ensure that this information is true. The regulations also require that no accounts with false identity information are created, and that no “fans” must be traded.

中广网北京12月16日消息 北京市16日公布实施《北京市微博客发展管理若干规定》，提出任何组织或者个人注册微博客账号，应当使用真实身份信息；网站开展微博客服务，应当保证注册用户信息真实。规定还要求不得制造虚假的微博客用户，即不得买卖“粉丝”。

The regulations also demand that any organization or individual who registers a microblog account, writes, reproduces, publishes or disseminates information must use real ID information, and must not do so by a false identity, or an identity of someone else, and that companies and organizations must register with a code number.

《规定》要求，任何组织或者个人注册微博客账号，制作、复制、发布、传播信息内容的，应当使用真实身份信息，不得以虚假、冒用的居民身份信息、企业注册信息、组织机构代码信息进行注册。

A spokesperson for Beijing’s internet administration department said that the real identity information has to be given to the website running a microblog, while the username could be chosen freely. More folksy-put, there would be “a real name backstage, and a freely-chosen name on stage”.

北京市互联网信息内容主管部门新闻发言人就此表示，微博客账号注册信息真实是指用户提交网站注册的信息，用户使用微博客服务的名称可自愿选择。通俗地讲，就是“后台实名、前台自愿”。

The regulations point out that by adhering to the principles of active use, scientific development, legal administration, maintenance of security, the building and use of micro blogs, providers should play a positive role in society.

《规定》中明确提出，要坚持积极利用、科学发展、依法管理、确保安全的原则，加强微博客的建设、运用，发挥微博客服务社会的积极作用。

From a practical perspective, websites which operated micro blogs and users alike were called upon to disseminate information orderly, and to protect their legal interests. The public in general called for an honest network system, and the websites and micro bloggers should therefore communicate true, accurate information, and should not communicate false and harmful information.

从实际情况看，开展微博客服务的网站和微博客用户呼吁规范网络传播秩序，保障其合法权益；社会公众也普遍呼吁要建立网络诚信体系，网站和微博客用户应当提供真实、准确的信息，不得提供虚假、有害信息。

The regulations stipulate that “in this city [i. e. Beijing], website operators and micro blog providers must go through the relevant business license approval procedures, and apply to the city government internet content administration departments, in accordance with the law, for auditing and approval”.

《规定》指出，“本市行政区域内网站开展微博客服务，应当在申请电信业务经营许可或者履行非经营性互联网信息服务备案手续前，依法向市互联网信息内容主管部门提出申请，并经审核同意”。

In a somewhat more detailed article^*), the city government’s regulations are quoted as requiring already existing operators and providers to get the formalities of application and approval done within three months, as there had been “some” cases where operators and micro bloggers hadn’t performed their duties in accordance with the laws and regulations, and to implement the regulations with the users.

(针对当前有些网站和微博客用户未按照国家有关规定履行义务的问题，《规定》提出，在本规定公布前已开展微博客服务的网站，应当自本规定公布之日起三个月内依照本规定向市互联网信息内容主管部门申办有关手续，并对现有用户进行规范。)

I seem to remember several previous attempts by either national or local governments to make the Chinese internet more “transparent”. If this local test in Beijing’s metropolitan area proves to be more successful, and if it is going to be spread to the rest of the country, remains to be seen. It would obviously make the CCP’s supervision much easier, and it would also be in line with the “social management” concept,

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Note

^*) originally published by chinanews.com‘s IT website, republished by CNR.

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Related

» Online Guidance of Public Opinion, Nov 28, 2011
» BoZhu Interview: A Common Virtual Space, October 23, 2011
» Learn from Japan: a Normal Internet, April 23, 2011
» The Center Forever, March 13, 2011

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Obituary: Shangguan Pengfei, 1988 – 2011

Shangguan Pengfei (上官鹏飞), a Sanshou athlete from Henan Province, died on December 11 or December 12. He had been in a coma for 42 days after he had been knocked out by Cui Fei (崔飞), an athlete with Beijing’s Armed Police Force. Shangguan had reportedly suffered a fatal blow to the back of his head in a national semi-final in Haikou, Hainan, on October 31. Officials from China’s sports authority denied reports that treatment had been untimely, and other allegations.

Red Net Changsha (红网长沙) reports that in a briefing in  Beijing on Wednesday, the Wushu Management Center gave its first official comment on Shangguan’s death. All first-aid and further measures had been carried out properly, Management Center officials said, but fierce discussions among netizens followed the briefing anyway. There had been online allegations that the referee hadn’t stopped the fight in time, after Shangguan had been hit on the back of his head. The Management Center said that a referee committee had watched the footage of the fight on the same evening and had come to the conclusion that neither  Shangguan nor  Cui had used inproper means, and that the referee had acted correctly.

In what is said could be a confusion between Cui, and another man of the same name’s microblog, netizens had reportedly not only accused the referee, but Cui, too – for “lacking martial arts virtues” (缺乏武德). “Human-flesh searchers” criticized Cui for “travelling” and “visiting good restaurants”. Answering a question from an IFeng (Phoenix) reporter, Wushu Mangement official Gao Xiaojun (高小军) said that Cui had been to the hospital after the match and that both he and other members of his team had spontaneously expressed their regrets to Shangguan’s family.

Shangguan Pengfei was born in Jiaozuo (焦作市),  a prefecture-level city in Henan Province , on October 24, 1988. According to Baike Baidu, he had travelled to Shaolin Monastery a number of times ever since he had been a child. Among his main personal sports achievements was the Wushu School’s championship in 2008, and ranking third in third at the 2010 World Wushu Championship (国际武术搏击王争霸赛季军), apparently in Chongqing.

Across the English Channel: Twins no More

Bishop’s Stortford, Hertfordshire, near London, has terminated its special relationships with its former twin towns in Germany (Friedberg, near Frankfurt) and France (Villiers-sur-Marne). The Guardian, on December 1, interpreted that as the latest manifestation of grassroots Euroscepticism. One of the few opponents in the town council, however, refers to the decision as a moment of ideological lunacy on the part of the Tories. (The Labour Party isn’t represented in the council.)

Wechselgeldmangel. Bitte passend zahlen.

Friedberg’s mayor is quoted by the Guardian as saying that the decision came as no surprise: “Not enough young people have been involved. These days they go to China, Russia and the US.”

Earlier this year, another Guardian article argued that in Coventry, which has a particularly high number of city partnerships,

a trawl of the local newspaper archives finds many mentions over the last five years of local dignitaries jetting off to various twin towns, but comparatively few tales about ordinary people benefiting.

This was a reflection when Doncaster (east of Manchester) cancelled its trans-channel partnerships.

Many Germans would agree. My experience differs. In fact, England was one of the few affordable destinations for me or my family when I was a child. I was no exception – many of my classmates, too, had their first stay abroad in our English partner town. But things seem to have changed. Well-off families travel the globe, and others either stay at home, or head for southern European destinations during the summer vacations, and straight for the beach, a swimming-pool, or a discotheque. The idea that travelling might be about learning about foreign people and their lives  seems to be a thing of the past – or maybe we tend to believe that we know each other well enough, anyway, within Europe.

The Tory members of Bishop Stortford’s city council probably believe that, too.

According to German daily Die Welt, Friedberg’s mayor was surprised, even though the British side had always been somewhat reserved. (The sub-headline, on the other hand, suggests that there had been no surprise.)

Italian partners, too, had been much more reserved during the most recent meeting, Keller is quoted, and that had been a change, as the atmosphere had been much more friendly in the past. And taking a look at the bigger political picture as he sees it, Keller deems Bishop Stortford’s decison as a step back into English isolation (ein Schritt zurück in die englische Isolation).

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Related?

» China, Myanmar: Friendly Consultations, Oct 3, 2011

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Internationalizing the RMB: Great Risks, and Great Rejuvenation

Expanding RMB trade settlement to countries with other currencies is Beijing’s way to smooth trade, and an approach that plays a part in the gradual internationalization of the RMB, CNTV wrote on December 7. The latest two countries joining the settlement network are Australia and Canada, increasing its number to nine foreign currencies traded directly against the RMB. To be paid in US dollars spells losses for Chinese exporters, CNTV quotes a CEO who adds the wish that [w]e hope the RMB can become a freely convertible currency soon, so that banks overseas can have enough RMB to handle RMB trade.

Settlement agreements with Singapore and South Korea are reportedly being negotiated.

A paper by Chen Fengying (陈凤英), the Institute of World Economic Studies’ director (China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (中国现代国际关系研究院 / 世界经济研究所), for discussion at a forum of international (political) economists held at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ Institute of World Economics and Politics (中国社会科学院世界经济与政治研究所) on November 5, explores the RMB’s internationalization as China’s strategic choice¹⁾:

The global financial crisis has caused people to reflect on the malpractice²⁾ within the international currency system with the US dollar at its core. People who understand the issue have started a search for a reserve currency which would be suitable for decoupled sovereign countries, and which would maintain stability in the long run. The G-20 summit in Cannes, France, will discuss reform of the global currency system.³⁾ Given these times of financial crisis, the reform of the international currency system is imperative. The US dollar’s hegemony facing an unprecedented challenge is a major opportunity at this critical point in time, and also provides choices in the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.

金融危机引发人们对以美元为核心的国际货币体系诸多弊端的深刻反思，有识之士开始探寻一种与主权国家脱钩、长期保值稳定的国际储备货币，2011年在法国戛纳举行的二十国集团(G20)峰会将讨论国际货币体系改革。后危机时代，国际货币体系改革势在必行，美元霸权受到空前挑战，人民币国际化适逢重大契机，亦是中华民族伟大复兴的战略选择。

In three short chapters, Chen states that

1. there is good progress in the RMB’s internationalization (basically as described by CNTV above), which started only little more than a year ago,
2. the RMB’s internationalization will be a long process with huge risks, and that
3. strategic choices would be crucial.

By 2010, more than 67,000 companies were involved in the expanding RMB settlement pilot project, earning 500 billion Yuan RMB within the project, i. e. two per cent of China’s total foreign trade. Chen quotes Jin Zhongxia, the Central Bank’s (the People’s Bank of China) deputy director-general of the international department, as predicting that the amount settled in RMB would be ten-fold (apparently by the end of 2011), and therefore account  to 20 per cent of China’s foreign trade.

Another step described is the issuance of RMB bonds abroad, to be bought by central bank and certain clearance agencies. Assets held by foreign investors would indirectly stimulate global RMB circulation.

I’m not going into the details of the cautious steps advised under chapter 2, but the goals stated there might be noteworthy. By 2020, Chen writes, the RMB should become the leading regional currency, and around 2030, the goal of comprehensive internationalization should be achieved, to finally make the RMB a global reserve currency.

Coordination with the international currency system reform would be advisable, notes Chen.

Chapter 3, among others, deals with the importance of challenging the dollar (whose role is an American core national interest), without risking the depreciation of the dollar (apparently both for the role exchange rates play in a country’s competitiveness, and for the value of the American bonds held by the Chinese central bank). The U.S., warns Chen, would do anything to preserve the dollar’s, and therefore America’s, economic hegemony. (最后必须指出，美元霸权地位是美国国家利益的核心，也是维护美国经济霸权的支柱。挑战美元即是挑战美国霸权，为维护美元霸权地位，美国会不惜做任何事情。日元的惜日与欧元的今天即是前车之鉴，教训必须切记，有谋才能取胜。)

I’d like to immerse myself in this topic, but time is scarce and will remain scarce, until Christmas. Just to round the picture out a bit, Michael Pettis doesn’t believe in a leading role for the RMB as a reserve currency, citing the Asian Development Bank as predicting that by 2035, the RMB may comprise about 3 to 12 per cent of international reserves.

Pettis didn’t probably take the gradual internationalization approach into account – he wrote his post in October 2010 -, but believes that there are basically two ways.

First, China can run a current account deficit.  Second, foreign capital inflows into China can be matched by Chinese capital outflows.  The second way does not result in a net foreign accumulation of Chinese assets, but it allows foreigners to hold renminbi bonds and other assets to the same extent that Chinese hold assets abroad (above the current account surplus, of course).

Explorations there. Also, Pettis believes that the US economy could only profit from alternative global reserve currencies – if only they’d emerge.

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Notes

¹⁾ published online on November 23.
²⁾ another possible translation would be abuse or abusive (弊端, bì duān).
³⁾ The Cannes G-20 summit was held from November 3 to 4, and its French presidency was apparently *cough* sponsored by a number of famous brands.

G20 presidency sponsors

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Related

» International Reserve Currency, Wikipedia, as of Dec 12

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Learning Chinese with the CCP: fudaoyuan

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辅导员 (fǔdǎoyuán)

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[Main Link here.]
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Vocabulary Example: You are going to hear a telephone conversation between an American college advisor and a Chinese student (click picture for example of use)

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From Baike Baidu:

Assistant counsellors [fudaoyuan] is a short term for people who assist different kinds of work, such as psychological counsellors, class tutors, technical instructors, or specifically university tutors. The tutor system is currently a universal measure taken by universities as a student management system [apparently an aspect of "social management"]. From senior students or from instructors, someone is chosen to do additional work as a fudaoyuan, taking care of students’ ideological and political instruction, student management and unity between students and the party. A fudaoyuan usually manages one or several grades.
辅导员是从事辅导工作的人员的简称。如心理辅导员、班级辅导员、技术辅导员等或专指高校辅导员。辅导员制度是目前大学普遍采取的一种学生管理制度。新生入学时，从高年级学生或教师中挑选专职或兼职人员担任学生的辅导员，从事学生的思想政治教育、学生管理以及学生党团建设等方面的工作。每个辅导员一般管理一个或数个班级。

Job Requirements

Tutors are usually chosen in accordance with the following standards:

(1) politically strengthened, professional, with strict discipline, correct style, innovative and flexible thought, and a conscientious approach to work;

(2) a studying record beyond undergraduate, in possession of ability and political integrity, dedication, devotion to teaching, and love for the cause of ideological and political education;

(3) having a corresponding academic and specialized background, strong organizational and management skills, and communication skills (speaking and in writing), having received systematic training for the job, and a certificate;

(4) usually required to be a CCP member, and psychology or education are preferred majors when choosing a tutor.

职业要求

一般选择辅导员的标准有：
（一）政治强、业务精、纪律严、作风正、创新思维灵活、工作认真；
（二）具备本科以上学历，德才兼备，乐于奉献，潜心教书育人，热爱大学生思想政治教育事业；
（三）具有相关的学科专业背景，具备较强的组织管理能力和语言、文字表达能力，接受过系统的上岗培训并取得合格证书。
（四）一般要求是中共党员，心理学、教育学尤其是思想政治教育专业。

Responsibilities

(1) To help students in establishing a correct view of the world and of life, values, firmly on the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation as a common ideal and conviction. Active guidance of students to continuously strive for higher goals, make the advanced elements among them establish the lofty ideals of communism, and establish a firm belief in Marxism.

（一）帮助高校学生树立正确的世界观、人生观、价值观，确立在中国共产党领导下走中国特色社会主义道路、实现中华民族伟大复兴的共同理想和坚定信念。积极引导学生不断追求更高的目标，使他们中的先进分子树立共产主义的远大理想，确立马克思主义的坚定信念；

To cut it short from here…

…, paras (2) and (3) are still about morals and ideology; (4) and (5) about more practical matters, including help for students in financial difficulties; (6) is about collectivism among students, and their political education and organizational strengths; (7) is about organizing and coordinating ideological and political theoretical education between teachers and other staff; and (8) is about stimulating enthusiasm and initiative about students.

According to the Baike article (as of today), there is a shift from appointing students or instructors as tutors or fudaoyuans, to choosing professionals from outside the universities.

Eric Fish of Sinostand explained on December 6 why a fudaoyuan he once met was a bitch, and in the commenting thread, I tried to explain why that bitch is or was a reasonably good fudaoyuan.

After all, she efficiently prepared the kids for a life on the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.

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Previous Posts in this Series

» Learning Chinese with the CCP: Inevitable Humiliations, Sept 17, 2011
» Learning Chinese with the CCP: Dangwai, Jan 31, 2011

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Related

Hermit: the Newest Angry Professor strives for your Originality, June 2, 2011

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Taiwan’s Presidential Election Trends, according to the Prediction Future Markets

I’m not sure if Taiwanese opinion polls benefit experienced Taiwanese readers – to someone like me, who is no close observer, most of them seem to be of little use.

Look at those included in the chart underneath, for example. They are all pan-blue sources: the China Times, United Daily News, and Apple Daily. The Apple Daily may not be very China-friendly, but according to Wikipedia Chinese (as of today), they are said to have close connections to president Ma Ying-jeou‘s staff, and Apple Daily’s numbers of December 3 would seem to confirm that.

Opinion Polls, all Pan-Blue Sources, Nov. 16 to Dec. 7, 2011

Yes – 47.04 per cent of the interviewees would vote for Ma Ying-jeou, 36.9 per cent for Tsai Ing-wen, and 12.11 per cent for James Soong Chu-yu, according to Apple Daily, which published a poll completed on December 3 (see Ma’s best number ever in the chart above – if Wikipedia quoted them correctly).

For the numbers included in the chart, and beyond (back to July 1, and including sources other than pan-blue), see “Three-Way Race, Wikipedia”.

Polls seem to be much more part of the “spin-doctoring” in Taiwan, than they are in most European or North American countries. 47.04 per cent for Ma Ying-jeou – not even a distant watcher can take that forecast serious.

Evidence so far suggests that prediction markets are at least as accurate as other institutions predicting the same events with a similar pool of participants, Wikipedia (English) of today suggests.

So there might be alternative sources. And there are prediction markets forecasts for Taiwan’s presidential elections in January, too. Here, the picture is very different: there, Tsai has been more likely to win the elections of the time, ever since October 26, 2011 – the  market forecast is run by the National Chengchi University (國立政治大學). What looks particularly plausible there is that Ma’s chances fell, just as Soong Chu-yu’s were rising. This would seem plausible because Soong’s People-First Party is “bluer” and closer to China than Ma’s KMT, and unlikely to draw support from any other party than the KMT.

The Economist, not necessarily a fan of Tsai Ing-wen, quoted the Chengchi University numbers, too, on November 19:

A prediction market run by National Chengchi University, accurate in the past, says the probability of his winning the election dived from over 59% on October 16th to under 42% on November 14th; Ms Tsai stands at 49%. Opinion polls in the island’s media, which usually leans towards the KMT, also show slumping popularity, though Mr Ma still leads by a few percentage points.

[Update, Dec 13: XFuture and the National Chengchi University prediction markets are basically identical, according to Echo Taiwan]
Echo Taiwan has also turned to a future market for clues (there are links within his paragraph – see there:

Xfuture, the future market website, claimed to be more accurate than most opinion surveys conducted by media in Taiwan, is conducting surveys in the form of stock exchanges for the upcoming legislative and presidential elections. There are 3 contract groups for the president election. I am sharing the timeline of one of them, The Estimate of Vote Percentage (2012總統選舉投票率預測), for all three candidates: Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文, DPP), Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九, KMT) and James Soong (宋楚瑜, PFP). The data covers the period from 9/1/2011 to 12/2/2011 for both Tsai and Ma. Soong was not included into this contract group until 11/4/11. At the time of preparing this post (12/2), the data show a profile of Tsai : Ma : Soong = 51.0% : 37.1% : 12.5%.

Here, too, Ma’s rate is falling, as Soong’s is rising.

Echo Taiwan’s post also contains guesses and clues as to which events of the past two months may have led to the shift in Tsai’s favor, plus links to further posts by other bloggers. Just as there, the Economist’s Nov 19 article attributes some cause for Ma’s troubles to events prior to Soong entering the race:

But Mr Ma’s popularity was falling even before Mr Soong’s formal candidacy. He dropped a bombshell on October 17th by saying that he favours signing a peace treaty with China within the next decade, provided the public and parliament supported it. It was the first time that Mr Ma had given a timetable for negotiating such a hugely sensitive issue, and it has whipped up alarm in the media and among a China-wary public. The DPP accuses Mr Ma of steering the island towards unification. Mr Ma later backtracked, suggesting, among other things, that a treaty would need a referendum.

Only to backtrack once again, shortly after that. Ma had apparently become dizzy.

Early in October, political commenter Wong Chong Xia warned the KMT that

Ma Ying-jeou’s support rate never exceeds a ten-percent lead over Tsai Ing-wen, and the pan-green camp’s voting rate has always been stronger than the pan-blue camp’s, and past experience shows that when it is a one-on-one race, and the pan-blue camp’s lead isn’t better than ten per cent, it is the loser when the ballots are counted on election night.

I don’t know if the future markets include reflections of the phenomenon observed by Wong, and I can’t tell Wong’s observation itself is correct – but at the moment, Tsai looks like the more likely winner of next year’s presidential elections.

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Related

» Closing in on the Presidency, Nov 25, 2011

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Updates/Related

» Election Campaign Coverage in China, Taipei Times, Dec 12, 2011
» Presidential Debate, PTS TV / Youtube, Dec 2, 2011

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Pressure Groups and Propaganda: Victims of Something

If someone had asked me before August this year who Chris Gelken is, China Radio International (CRI) would probably have come to my mind. In August, CCTV-9 (China’s state-television English channel) and Iran’s state-owned Press TV joined the picture. That, plus an article Gelken – allegedly, that is – wrote for The Latest, a Citizen-Journalism-for-All website, founded by Marc Wadsworth, a broadcaster, writer and political activist, according to the Guardian.

One of the two most unpleasant paragraphs was the introduction – written by “The Latest”, not by Gelken, with a question as to why a significant minority of disgruntled white voters reject the mainstream parties for the racist British National Party, and the announcement that Chris Gelken gives some clues in this frank description of his “metamorphosis from a liberal with socialist tendencies to a conservative nationalist with a hint of xenophobia”. That one struck me, because it seemed to blame Britain’s “realities” for BNP voters’ individual decisions. Realities shape decisions for sure – but a vote cast is an individual responsibility.

The second paragraph that struck me was about Gelken losing his temper with a barman who didn’t know what a pie is – that paragraph was attributed to Gelken himself.

In August, I took Gelken’s authorship for granted. Not knowing who Marc Wadsworth was, I saw no conflict between those who wrote the introduction and the article. This was my reaction, in August.

Gelken reacted to my post on December 6, in a thread underneath my commenting rules.

He wrote two initial comments to which I answered after some reflection, but without seeing much news in it, plus a third, which did include information that actually did.

My feelings about Gelken haven’t changed – but as far as the article’s authenticity is concerned,  his third comment in the commenting-rules thread does look like a game-changer to me. From Gelken’s comment:

Wadsworth begins paragraph 6 with:

“Several emails passed between Gelken and the editor, culminating in a sub-edited comment piece that was shown to Gelken before publication. He objected.”

While Gelken’s quote stops here, the original last sentence actually continued:

He objected, though the article was a true reflection of the copy he had sent to the editor.

What’s a true reflection? As far as I can see, the statement doesn’t offer an explanation – nor does it simply publish Gelken’s article word by word, which should have been the easiest solution, from the beginning.

The statement by “The Latest” in full can be found here.

Gelken wrote in several comments on FOARP’s blog that there was no way for him to sue “The Latest”. I find that hard to believe, as stated here. But having seen the approach “The Latest” has taken – publishing the article as Gelken’s, and stating on another page that this (only, I’d like to add) reflects what Gelken wrote, I had to think again.

The most severe criticism “The Latest” seems to have in store for Gelken is this paragraph, also quoted in their above statement, and attributed to him:

“I was hearing and seeing things I never thought I would see. What began, I am sure with the best of intentions, has gone badly wrong. Reverse discrimination, unparalleled and unrestricted immigration, a real fear among some officials of offending certain “minorities” (I hate that word) that has reached the point where some people are being excluded or discriminated against simply on the basis of being Anglo-Saxon…”

I’m getting the impression that Gelken and “The Latest” happened to disagree about a  crucial definition of who belongs into the camp of innocent victims – about UK citizens, or Anglo-Saxons, for example (vis-à-vis continental EU Europeans, if that quote was correctly attributed to Gelken by “The Latest”) -, and that they fell out with each other over a definition of who is a victim after all, with all the toxic dust that usually rises in such a case.

Maybe “The Latest” safely fulfilled its legal obligations by publishing the statement which refers to the “true reflection”. Maybe no lawyer would want to pick up Gelken’s case, given the politically-correct minefield on which the quarrel between him and “The Latest” is moving around. At least in Germany, that wouldn’t look inconceivable to me. There will be no assigned defender, in a civil-law case in my country.

Political and private quarrels alike seem to become particularly toxic when they involve victimhood issues. Anyone may claim being victimized for being a member of a certain group, depending on the circumstances. Anyone may claim to be victimized when he that for any other reason, he has been treated unfairly individually. They won’t necessarily refer to themselves as victims – but that’s how it frequently comes across.

And the greater injustices someone has suffered – for real, or according to his or her  convincingly expressed feelings, the more society will owe him or her. A continental European’s right to work in the UK would stand or fall with how he is defined – as a “victim”, or as a “perpetrator”, or neither. In the two latter cases, he has no claims to make.

Not everyone generally agrees with these rules of the game, but many people – members of the public, pressure groups, and politicians – are willing to play along.

To be clear: there are victims, there are people who make the genuine experience of being victims, every day, and there are people who have to suffer unacceptable injustices. But that is something that is best judged case by case.

Another noteworthy aspect seems to be Gelken’s timing in his comments. In my view, “the Latest” link he provided in his third comment was the only crucial one in our discussion – but crucial it was. Didn’t he see that it was the only one that counted? The thread on FOARP’s blog, concerning the same topic, is even longer than the one on mine.

One explanation could be that Gelken wanted to make the debate as effective as possible – and used my blog as a platform for a vendetta against “The Latest”. As far as I can see, there would be nothing objectionable in that, except that the timing required an unnecessary amount of time – and I wouldn’t blog the way I am, if I had something against propagandists discussing their present or former work here. If they do, I can spend less time on writing Net Nanny posts.

Another explanation could be that Gelken took offense from being referred to as an, umm, anchorman (for the sake of civility, I’m not going to use the noun I deem truly apposite re Chris Gelken). But I’m not buying that. Maybe I’m lacking sensitivity in that area, but if someone called me an, umm, blogger (for the sake of civility, I’m not going to use the noun I deem truly apposite re JR), I’d see no damage this might do to this blog or its credibility. It would only bother me if people whom I’d expect to shrug took such a line serious, and told me that the guy who wrote this actually had a point.

And yet another explanation could be that Gelken simply didn’t see the importance of that “The Latest’s” true-reflection statement, or that he took it for granted that I had read it before. But he’s a propagandist – I’m pretty sure that he was an effective one, and that he knows how an audience receives and processes information.

Either way, there is one important point. While my exchange of comments hasn’t changed my mind about Gelken, I’m not looking at the “Latest” article in question as one written which was written by Gelken any longer. If this blog was used by him as a platform against the approach taken by “The Latest”, so be it – so long as it helps to add some transparency to what actually happened, or so long as it helps to question the narrative spread by “The Latest”.