Hu Jintao’s Condolences: Across a Narrow Strip of Water

[Main Link: Enorth, March 18, 2011 / Xinhua Net]

According to the foreign ministry’s website, state chairman Hu Jintao went to the Japanese embassy in Beijing on March 18 in the afternoon to express condolences for the victims of the “3-11″ earthquake. He and ambassador Uichiro Niwa also had a short meeting. On the behalf of the Chinese government and people, Hu Jintao gave his regards to ambassador Uichiro Niwa and the Japanese people, and expressed condolences to the victims. Hu Jintao said that China and Japan were friendly neighbors, across a narrow strip of water between them^*) (中日两国是一衣带水的友好近邻). The Chinese government and people were actively supporting earthquake relief efforts in Japan, and would continue to provide all necessary help. He  wished the Japanese people that they would soon overcome the difficulties, and that they could rebuild their homes shortly. China is very concerned about the safety of Chinese citizens’ in Japan. After the “3-11″ earthquake, the Japanese government actively helped the Chinese citizens in Japan. The Chinese side expressed its sincere thanks.

Hu Jintao signs book of condolences at Japanese embassy in Beijing (click photo for Xinwen Lianbo news on YouTube)

[All statements in this second paragraph are quoting the Japanese ambassador.] Uichiro Niwa said that after the “3-14″ earthquake occured, H. E. Hu Jintao had [contacted] H. M. the Emperor [致电, which can mean either a phonecall, or, more likely, a telegram], wishing the Japanese people that they would soon overcome the difficulties, and that they could rebuild their homes shortly. The Chinese government had provided material assistance to Japan, and quickly dispatched an international rescue team to actively carry out rescue work. Many Chinese people had also expressed condolences to the Japanese side. With support from the international community, Japan was carrying out disaster relief. The Japanese government would  ensure the safety of Chinese citizens in Japan and make every effort to provide them with support and help. The Japanese side wanted to keep close contact and communication with the Chinese side.

State councillor Dai Bingguo (戴秉国), foreign minister Yang Jiechi (杨洁篪), vice minister of commerce Gao Hucheng (高虎城), the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries’ (CPAFFC, 对外友协会) president Chen Haosu (陈昊苏) and others accompanied [Hu Jintao] to condole and to take part in the meeting.

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Note
^*) 一衣带水 yī yī dài shuǐ : the term expresses that even if there is something separating between two sides, it doesn’t create a great distance, and isn’t as broad as to discourage contacts (指虽有江河湖海相隔，但距离不远，不足以成为交往的阻碍) – zhidao.baidu.com

Related
China’s Hu offers Condolences, Kyodo News, March 18, 2011
Greying Protest Elegy, December 11, 2010

“Dalai”, Wenchuan 2008: “Cold and Detached Gloating”

A specter is haunting the Chat Rooms

Tibet Net (中国西藏网) reacted on March 17, to this year’s March 10 statement by Tibet’s spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama. The editorial has since been republished by a number of other websites, such as Enorth (Tianjin) and Xinhua Net. Titled “Can the Seeds of Hatred bear the Fruit of Harmony?”, the editorial condemns the Dalai Lama’s statement as the usual triad (三段式文风) of  “discrediting China and its Tibet policy, inciting Tibetans at home and abroad to resist the Chinese Communist Party, and calling on the international community for support” (“抹黑中国和西藏政策、挑动境内外藏人反抗中共、呼吁国际社会支持”). The word Statement (声明) itself, – for the Dalai Lama’s March 10 statement -, is also put between quotation marks in the editorial. In addition to the above triad, the Dalai Lama had also said that while contacts between Han Chinese and Tibetans abroad were bearing fruits (取得成果), Tibetans at home should also create the conditions to strengthen contacts and understanding with Han Chinese compatriots.

[Main Link: Enorth, March 18, 2011 - all links within quotations added during translation - JR]

In the second paragraph, the editorial condemns, in the usual words, the uprising of March 10, 2008, recalls the 2008 Olympic torch relay, and the Dalai’s cold and detached gloating after the Wenchuan earthquake disaster^*) of May 12, 2008 (5月12日四川汶川大地震后达赖的冷漠和达赖集团的幸灾乐祸). All that hadn’t only made

the whole country gradually understand the true face of the Dalai clique, but it also gave some overseas Chinese with  some previous illusions about the Dalai a startling awakening. It was exactly the Dalai cliques ample performance in 2008 which made the sons and daughters of the Chinese people conscientiously examine the Dalai’s real face, behind his trademark smile, and to begin to expose the Dalai cliques indecency, to raise their voices at home and abroad in a powerful counterattack against the Dalai clique’s splittist words and deeds, and the Western media’s rumorous and defaming torrent. (… 不仅让全国人民进一步看清了达赖集团的真实面目，还使一些过去对达赖还抱有些许幻想的海外华侨华人也幡然惊醒。正是达赖集团在2008年的充分表演，促使全体中华儿女认真审视达赖那张招牌式笑脸下面遮盖的真实面目，开始揭挖达赖集团的丑行，在境内外掀起了声势浩大的反击达赖集团分裂言行和西方媒体造谣诬蔑的声浪。)

This had left a deep impression on many Western politicians, who had supported the Dalai clique, writes the editorial. It describes the Dalai clique‘s approach to strengthening Tibetan-Han exchanges as an attempt to repair its image among the Chinese people and overseas Chinese. The clique had painstakenly (or sedulously, 刻意) chosen some people with bad feelings (不满) towards the government to act as “Han representatives” to twitter their regards to Liu Xiaobo (刘晓波), to indicate that the Dalai Lama didn’t oppose “Han people”, and actually attached importance to “Tibetan-Han relations”. At the same time, the clique had recruited outside insurgents, establishing the Tibetan-Han Friendship Association and some “Han-Tibetan forums” to urge proposals for “Tibetan independence”.

These measures had, however, shown hardly any effect outside some network connections, and the resistance and opposition of overseas Chinese against the Dalai Lama kept growing, notes the editorial.

In his “five-point peace program”, within his “Middle Way”, he said openly that he would expel all Han people from Tibet. In his March 10 2008 statement, the Dalai said “in these nearly sixty years, “all of Tibet’s Tibetans lived under the oppression of the Chinese people”, “have become an insignificant minority in their own country”, and had been “rapidly assimilated by the outnumbering population”. (在他公布的“中间道路”范本——1987年“五点和平方案”中，就公然宣称要把所有汉人赶出西藏。达赖在他2008年3月10日的声明中称，“在将近60年以来，全西藏的藏人在中国人的压迫下生活”，“藏族人降低为在自己的国家里无关紧要的少数民族，迅速被人口更加众多的中华民族所同化”。)

Where then, asks the editorial, would be a shadow of long-term mutual benefit between the Han and Tibetan nationalities? The “Dalai” wasn’t only inciting confrontation between nationalities, but, in a still more sinister way, used schools operated in India to make a young generation of Tibetans (“Tibetan compatriots”, 年轻一代藏胞), born outside China, believe in the same ideas, so that confrontation and hatred would continue. The editorial then quotes from a Tibetan activist‘s blog, Tenzin Tsundue, dated August 29, 2009, which I find hard to translate, and  of which I’m not sure if he is quoted correctly. Tsundue seems to discuss the same topic in an interview with the Daily Star, published on December 2003:

It is such a tragedy that the first thing you learned as a child was that you do not belong here and that you cannot own anything here. My parents escaped into India in 1960 after the Chinese occupation of Tibet. We were constantly told that we would return one day and that the life in exile was temporary. My school years in 1980s and 1990s were spent in anxiety to grow up fast to do something in the freedom struggle. Today I am an activist. My writings are my expressions. As a kid I killed many Chinese soldiers in our Chinese-Tibetan war games. I used to go door-to-door in our refugee camp to call people for our village meetings. I was already an activist. I was born a refugee. I was born to fight for such a noble cause.

The editorial apparently attributes the war games referred to by Tsundue as part of the exile-Tibetan school curriculum, and goes on to portray life among the exiles as afflicted by anti-Chinese paranoia.

The Dalai Lama seemed to be happy with this state of affairs, as he continued to refer to the 2008 protests as non-violent, and that a younger generation had inherited the sincerity and courage to continue the Tibetan cause in his March 10, 2011 statement. The editorial then refers to a speech by the Dalai Lama of February 9, at Taj Mahal Hotel in Bombay (Mumbai), where he is quoted as saying that in the 2008 incident, including Tibetans older than ten years, 99 percent of Tibetans had participated, for the benefit of their nationality, which had marked a great turning point in thought.

The editorial was first published on March 17, seven days after the Tibetan protests’ third anniversary.

The editorial ends with a Martin Luther King jr. quote, that a good purpose couldn’t be achieved by evil means, and suggests that hate education and the “seeds of confrontation” the Dalai Lama was sowing could not bear harmonious fruits, and showed the hypocrisy in his exchange approach between Tibetan and Han people.

It seems noteworthy that the editorial doesn’t explicitly accuse the Dalai Lama as having given a starting signal to the 2008 protests. If any such connection is suggested, the term “Dalai clique”, which can – ultimately, in the minds of state security or Han nationalists – refer to almost everything Tibetan, is used instead.

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Note / Update
^*) Indifference is attributed to the Dalai Lama (达赖的冷漠); and gloating to the Dalai clique (达赖集团的幸灾乐祸).

Related
Dolkar Tso thanks Samdrup’s Lawyers, June 26, 2010
“Concerning Traitors”, August 25, 2009
“Serf Emancipation Day”, March 28, 2009
Wen Jiabao: “You may refer to the five-point proposal…”, March 13, 2009

Update/Related
Letter from a Birmingham Jail, MLK jr., April 16, 1963

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Reactions to the Fukushima I Disaster

I don’t know a great deal about how nuclear power plants work. Nor do I know if it was the earthquake itself or rather the tsunami which disabled cooling / safety mechanisms at the Fukushima I nuclear power plant. And nobody can tell yet as to how far the struggle for containing the fallout will be successful, or as to how far it will fail to succeed.

But people and governments in different places are drawing conclusions already. There is political fallout that the civil nuclear industry will struggle to contain, at least in some countries.

Fukushima is bad news for all of us, and for Japan (possibly for neighboring countries, too) in particular. It’s also bad news for the nuclear industry – General Electric, for example. The company hopes to sell nuclear reactors to India. Bloomberg quotes Debasish Mishra, Mumbai-based senior director at Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, as saying that

The Japan accident has created a very, very tough situation for India, actual implementation of nuclear power projects will now certainly take a backseat [...]. It will be very difficult to sell the idea of nuclear power to people for any political party after the Japan disaster.

It may be a different story in China.

Xie Zhenhua, vice chairman of the National Development and Reform Commission, is quoted as saying (also by Bloomberg) that Fukushima I may become a factor in the drafting of China’s energy plans. But the same news article adds that

in China, the government won’t change its plans to develop nuclear power, Zhang Lijun, vice minister of environmental protection, said a day after the 8.9-magnitude temblor struck off the eastern coast of Japan. Local media said the death toll from the quake and ensuing tsunami may exceed 10,000.

China has pledged to cut carbon emissions by switching to clean energy such as nuclear and wind power. It wants at least 15 percent of its energy mix to come from non-fossil fuels by 2020 and is building more atomic plants to help meet that goal.

Nuclear plants are apparently viewed quite positively in China. Most people I know think of them as clean sources of energy (and it’s said that they don’t smell, which is nice, too). Given that international affairs usually take second-seat in Chinese news anyway, the news about Fukushima may not leave as monumental an impression on Chinese minds anyway, as it may on, say, German minds. A majority of Germans has been skeptical of nuclear energy during all the industry’s history.

Censorship and the Department of Propaganda’s work may do the rest to keep the Chinese rather enthusiastic about nuclear fuel.

Some are enthusiastic for other reasons, given that disaster struck in Japan. ChinaSmack published a mixed bag of Chinese netizens’ comments. Censorship will, in all likelihood, distort the online picture of Chinese netizens’ reactions, be it for grossly and gleefully nationalist ones, be it for a comment like

“The casualties from an 8.9 event in China would be hundreds of times higher than in Japan.”

Censorship and propaganda will play a role in keeping the Chinese happy spectators of a nucelar energy policy.

But there may be more to it. Taiwan isn’t exactly panicking either. Klaus, a German journalist in Japan, wrote that Fukushima I has revived a public argument about the safety or unsafety of nuclear energy in Taiwan, where three nuclear power plants with six reactors are operating, and another one under construction. But Klaus also quotes Robin Winkler, co-chairman of Taiwan’s Green party (formerly an American, now a naturalized Taiwanese citizen), as saying that he doesn’t expect big demonstrations against nuclear power anytime soon. Taiwan’s per-capita energy consumption exceeds German consumption by 50 per cent, writes Klaus, and safety issues are hardly ever brought up by the media, he quotes Winkler, even though, ten years ago, then president Chen Shui-bian had halted construction of the fourth plant which is now again under construction.

That said, Taiwan’s opponents to nuclear fuel will organize demonstrations, if work on the fourth plant continues, Klaus quotes the Taipei Times – large-scale, if possible.

Did I mention that most Germans are skeptical of nuclear energy? The truth is that many are downright afraid of it. And the German center-right government, which – only months ago – prolonged a phase-out of German nuclear plants which had previously been negotiated with Germany’s major energy suppliers by its Social Democrat / Green predessors, is now downright afraid of the public mood. Seven German plants – built before 1980 – will be taken off the gridlines for at least three months, chancellor Angela Merkel announced on Monday. One of them, Neckarwestheim, will be switched off for good. Elections are looming in Baden-Württemberg, and in Rhineland-Palatinate.

It’s hard to imagine that Fukushima I won’t have an impact on public opinion in Japan. But right now, the mere struggle for survival probably eclipses any such debate.

Wen insists: China needs Political Reforms

Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao has once again said China needs to carry out political reforms.
He said the economic achievements of the last 30 years could be lost without “institutional” changes.
The premier did not spell out exactly what reforms are necessary – and said they would have to be introduced gradually.
But his comments appear to put him out of step with more conservative colleagues.
Mr Wen made his comments at an annual press conference held at the end of China’s annual parliamentary session in Beijing.

Chinese Premier calls for Political Reform, BBC News, March 14, 2011

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Related
Wu Bangguo: the Center Forever, no Lofty Ideas, March 13, 2011
No Hidden Ambitions, September 24, 2010
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Wu Bangguo: the Center Forever, no Lofty Ideas

You will have to work your way through a lot of partytalk, before you can read JR‘s exquisite conclusions. But if you are interested in some background to the current NPC’s plenary session, and particularly Wu Bangguo’s work report, it may be worth the trouble.

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Reminder: It is forbidden to use the internet and communication tools to engage in illegal activities,

was a Beijing Youthnet (or Beiqing Wang) note’s headline of March 1, 2011.

[Main Link: http://www.ynet.com/view.jsp?oid=76887736]

Beijing Youthnet: Share this Reminder

Concerning the Internet Code of Conduct’s legal requirements
关于互联网行为规范的法律要求

According to the “Constitution of the People’s Republic of China” and pertaining regulations, while the citizens’ right to free speech are legally protected, it is forbidden to use the internet, communication tools, media and other methods to engage in the following behavior:
根据《中华人民共和国宪法》和相关法律法规规定，在保护公民合法言论自由的同时，禁止利用互联网、通讯工具、媒体以及其他方式从事以下行为：

1. to organize or incite resistance, to break the constitution or laws and regulations, or the implementation of laws and regulations
一、组织、煽动抗拒、破坏宪法和法律、法规实施的。

2. to fabricate or distort facts, spread rumors, or to interfere with social management order
二、捏造或者歪曲事实，散布谣言，妨害社会管理秩序的。

3. to organize or incite illegal assembly, marches, demonstrations, or to disturb order in public places
三、组织、煽动非法集会、游行、示威、扰乱公共场所秩序的。

4. to engage in other violations of national, social, and collective interests, and the legitimate rights of citizens.
四、从事其他侵犯国家、社会、集体利益和公民合法权益的。

The authorities in charge will, in accordance with the law, strictly supervise and deal with the activities listed above, and the judiciary will investigate and punish those responsible for what constitutes a crime.
管理部门将依法严加监管上述行为并予以处理；对构成犯罪的，司法机关将追究刑事责任。

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The following are excerpts from Wu Bangguo‘s (吴邦国)

Work Report on the Fourth Session of the 11th NPC,

on March 10, 2011 (local time). Wu is chairman and party secretary of the National People’s Congress’ standing committee.

[Main Link: http://lianghui.china.com.cn/2011/2011-03/10/content_22100102_4.htm]

[All links within the quotes from Wu Bangguo's speed were added by translator - JR]

During the second half of last year, centering what constitutes the socialist system with Chinese characteristics, we held three meetings to review the mechanism which is taking shape, candidly talked about its significance, summed up the basic experiences, and analyzed the tasks which were taking shape. On all aspects, we agreed that the building of the socialist system with Chinese characteristics’ legal system is a milestone for our country’s socialist and democratic system, with great practical and far-reaching historical significance.

去年下半年以来，我们围绕形成中国特色社会主义法律体系，先后召开了三次座谈会，回顾形成历程，畅谈重大意义，总结基本经验，分析形势任务。 各方面一致认为，中国特色社会主义法律体系的形成，是我国社会主义民主法制建设史上的重要里程碑，具有重大的现实意义和深远的历史意义。

Firstly, the legal system of socialism with Chinese characteristics will forever be protected as the foundation of the legal system. That we combine Marxism’s basic principles and China’s specific realities, that we will go our own way and build socialism with Chinese characteristics, is the fundamental conclusion from our party’s summarized historical experience, and also the only correct road  for our country’s progress. In order to adhere to the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics, the most important thing is to adhere to the correct political direction, and not to waver over the institutional etc. major and cardinal problems. If we waver, not only would the building of socialist modernization lose its prerequisites; but the achieved development successes could also be lost, and the country could even enter the abyss of domestic chaos.

第一，中国特色社会主义法律体系是中国特色社会主义永葆本色的法制根基。把马克思主义基本原理同中国具体实际相结合，走自己的路，建设中国特色社会主义，是我们党总结历史经验得出的基本结论，也是我们国家发展进步的唯一正确道路。坚持中国特色社会主义道路，最重要的是坚持正确的政治方向，在涉及国家根本制度等重大原则问题上不动摇。动摇了，不仅社会主义现代化建设无从谈起，已经取得的发展成果也会失去，甚至国家可能陷入内乱的深渊。

China has established socialism with Chinese characteristics, as expressed in the constitution, it has established the basic national system and tasks,  the Chinese Communist Party’s leading position, the guiding position of the important thoughts of  Marxism-Leninism, the Mao Zedong Thought, the Deng Xiaoping Theory, and the Three Represents, the leadership by the working class, the state system of democratic dictatorship based on the worker-peasant alliance, and the political system of the National People’s Congress; we established that all state power belongs to the people, where citizens enjoy extensive rights and freedoms in accordance with the law, we established the multi-party cooperation and consultation system under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, the autonomy of nationalities and grassroot autonomy, public ownership as the main body and a variety of economic systems developing together, incomes / distribution in accordance with work performance [or "to each in accordance with his performance" - that's how I read "按劳分配" - JR], and a variety of distribution methods coexisting within the distribution system.

中国特色社会主义法律体系，是以宪法和法律的形式，确立了国家的根本制度和根本任务，确立了中国共产党的领导地位，确立了马克思列宁主义、毛泽东思想、邓小平理论和“三个代表”重要思想的指导地位，确立了工人阶级领导的、以工农联盟为基础的人民民主专政的国体，确立了人民代表大会制度的政体，确立了国家一切权力属于人民、公民依法享有广泛的权利和自由，确立了中国共产党领导的多党合作和政治协商制度、民族区域自治制度以及基层群众自治制度，确立了公有制为主体、多种所有制经济共同发展的基本经济制度和按劳分配为主体、多种分配方式并存的分配制度。

Based on China’s national situation, there are strong indications that there must be no variety of political parties taking turns in exercising power, that the guiding ideology must not be diversified, that there must be no “separation of powers” and no bi-cameral system, no federal state, and no privatization. The legal system of socialism with Chinese characteristics has helped the nation’s strength and prosperity, it has built the legal foundation for long-term peace and stability, and from this system, it is legally ensured that the Chinese Communist Party will always be the center (or core) of the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics, that state power remains firmly in the hands of the people, that [from this system,] national independence is legally ensured, [it ensures] national sovereignty and territorial integrity, national unity, adherence to an independent and autonomous foreign policy, the path of peaceful development, and [it ensures that] the country will always forge ahead into the correct direction of socialism with Chinese characteristics.

从中国国情出发，郑重表明我们不搞多党轮流执政，不搞指导思想多元化，不搞“三权鼎立”和两院制，不搞联邦制，不搞私有化。 中国特色社会主义法律体系的形成，夯实了立国兴邦、长治久安的法律根基，从制度上、法律上确保中国共产党始终成为中国特色社会主义事业的领导核心，确保国 家一切权力牢牢掌握在人民手中，确保民族独立、国家主权和领土完整，确保国家统一、社会安定和各民族大团结，确保坚持独立自主的和平外交政策、走和平发展 道路，确保国家永远沿着中国特色社会主义的正确方向奋勇前进。

Overall – headings included -, Wu Bangguo’s speech document seems to contain more than 16,000 characters. The unidentified official who – or so they say on the Council of Foreign Relations blog – slept as Wu Bangguo delivered his speech ought to  be forgiven.

Reportedly, Wu Bangguo’s speech rejected the concept of a  genuine multi-party system no less in his work report of last year, [Update/Correction, March 14: not last year, but in 2009 - JR] than he did on March 10 (local time) this year. JR, who has already engaged in translating some of the lines which caught most interest this year, but which are rarely given in full in English, will not engage in a comparison between Wu’s 2010 2009 and 2011 work reports. A more scientific internet, with more context to the headlines, is not only JR’s job, but the job of every scientific blogger. If you care and translate the relevant lines from Wu Bangguo’s 2010 2009 work report, let me know, and I’ll link to you.

These microphones don't lead to China, Comrade Jiabao

It would most probably be inaccurate to link Wu’s hardline speech to the current revolutions in the Middle East and North Africa. Chief state councillor Wen Jiabao‘s – apparent – efforts for political reforms last year did indeed go somewhat further than Wu’s defensive work report. Wen, after all, mentioned a need for reforms of our political system. But only days later – and two or three months before Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak would even remotely think of a need to leave his palace -, Wen’s vague utterances into a new political direction had become short-lived history. They did, however, re-appear once more – with a big bumper attached to it -, in a People’s Daily editorial, about a month after Wen’s address to Hong Kong and Macau newspeople. People’s Daily, on October 28, 2010, cited the CCP 17th Central Committee’s emphasis on

the adherence to the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics, upholding the party’s leadership, the role of the people as the masters of their country, the organic unity of government work and the rule of law, the active and prudent promotion of political restructuring, and the continuous advancement of the socialist political system, self-improvement, and development.

He Dongting, the People’s Daily editorialist, then aimed some criticism at a political school which maybe, or maybe not, includes Wen Jiabao^*):

Throughout the history of China’s development, people with lofty ideas – 仁人志士, rén rén zhì shì – had given the strife for the road of modern democracy a lot of tries, but in the end, they failed, as they didn’t correspond with China’s conditions, and the fundamental interests of the Chinese people. The facts show that only under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, can the people at large gain political power, and only with the establishment of the socialist system can China really leap from thousands of years of authoritarian [or despotic] rule to historical democratic policies.

Here’s another footnote to Wu’s work report: there’s a Confucian scholar in China, living in mountainous Guizhou Province, who may take some of Wu’s speech personal – the rejection not only of separation of powers, but of a bi-cameral system (i. e. parliament, supposedly), too. Then again, Jiang Qing (蒋庆), the scholar in question, favors a tri-cameral legislature.

And after all, what really matters is that the CCP will always be the center.

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Note

^*) Mind the footnote at this October 31 post – 仁人 (én rén) actually means a benevolent person, and 志士(zhì shì). Even if meant ironic here, the not-so-aggressive style could suggest that there were some respectable targets among He Dongting’s targets.

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Related

China’s Success or Undoing, Peter Foster (Telegraph), March 10, 2011
Confucianism Rediscovered, International Herald Tribune, Sept 14, 2006

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Tsai Ing-wen’s Presidential Bid: Democracy over Idolization

Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文), Taiwan’s main oppositional Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) chairwoman, announced on Friday that she will seek her party’s nomination to run for president in 2012. The following are excerpts from her statement.

[Main Link: http://www.iing.tw/2011/03/blog-post_1552.html]

[...]

也謝謝你們願意接受這個樣子的蔡英文 (click this picture for video)

During these two or three years [as the DPP's chairwoman], I have been to Taiwan’s big streets and small lanes, time after time. On vegetable markets, at street vendor stalls, and eateries, I have often seen children helping their parents with their business. On lardy tables, under dim lights, they were doing their homework. When there were many guests, they would clear the table, and take care of the guests. When looking on, I felt both dismayed and touched. They don’t have a minimum-standard environment, not even a desk, but they do it their own way, working on the pursuit of their own future.
這兩三年來，我奔波在台灣的大街小巷，在菜市場、路邊攤、小吃店，常常會看見幫忙家裡做生意的小朋友。他們放學回來，在油膩的桌上，在昏黃的燈光下，寫著功課。客人多的時候，必須把桌子讓出來，還要幫忙招呼。我看著他們，心裡充滿不捨與感動。 他們沒有最起碼的環境，甚至沒有書桌，可是他們用自己的方式，努力地在追求自己的未來。

I believe that when it comes to parents’ expectations and dreams for their children, there must be no gap between urbanites and countryside people, and no gap between the rich and the poor. So I told myself that for these children, we share an inescapable responsibility.
我相信，這世界上每一位父母對孩子的夢想和期許，不應該有城鄉或貧富的差距。於是，我告訴我自己，對這些孩子，我們有一份不能逃避的責任。

When my father was still alive, he wasn’t happy that I entered politics, but he also told me this: “Don’t compete with others. What other people won’t do, and what they don’t succeed in – that’s what you should do.” My decision today [to run for the DPP's presidential nomination] isn’t a fight for something, or a try to prove something. I have made this decision because I have a share in the responsibility which needs to be shouldered, and therefore, I must carry this mission.
父親在世的時候，並不喜歡我踏入政治這條路，但他也曾告訴我：「妳不需要跟別人爭。人家不做的、做不到的，妳再去做。」今天這個決定，不是為了爭奪什麼、或證明什麼；這個決定，是因為有一份責任需要被承擔，而我必須勇敢去背負這個使命。

[...]

Ever since president Ma took office, things have happened in Taiwan which never happened before, which made people go through collective emotions, and which kept hitting at them. When Chinese officials came here, police officers were busy with grabbing [RoC / Taiwanese] national flags away from the hands of their own people, and Taiwan’s diversity has been turned into a single voice.  [Following lines: references to a Taiwanese athlete's controversial disqualification at the 2010 Asian Games, and the deportation of Taiwanese citizens to China earlier this year.]
馬總統上任這三年來，台灣出現了很多以前不曾出現的事情，讓人民的集體情感，不停地被打擊。中國官員來了，我們的警察忙著從自己國民手上搶下國旗，把多元的台灣變成只有一種聲音 [我們的年輕運動員出國比賽，要為台灣爭光，卻遭受不公平的對待，委屈地坐在競技場中哭泣；我們的國民也被菲律賓無理地送到中國，連道歉也沒有一句。]

We aren’t asking for a lot. We only want the government to care about this, just as we do care. This country must make the next generation feel proud, and not anxious.
我們要的其實不多，我們只要政府跟我們一樣在意。這個國家必須讓下一代感到驕傲，而不是焦慮。

[...]

What I want to do won’t be easy. I want to take Taiwan’ from the politics of  intense emotions and hoarse roaring, to rational and persuasive politics. From the idolizing politics of the past, to politics which applies capability and communication to solving problems. From monopolist and allotted politics of minority groups to the participation of the majority – that’s our responsibility.
我想要做的事並不容易，但卻很重要，就是把台灣從過去激情嘶吼的政治，帶往一個理性說服的政治！從過去偶像崇拜的政治，帶往用能力和溝通解決問題的政治！從一個少數壟斷的分配政治，帶往多數參與的公共政治，這是我們大家共同的責任！

[...]

A-Gu, a Taiwanese blogger who is currently living in Texas, believes that Su Chen-chang (蘇貞昌), Taiwan’s former DPP prime minister and (probably) Tsai’s strongest competitor for the DPP’s nomination, would be a more capable campaigner.

And reading Tsai’s Ing-wen’s Friday statement (see above), I can certainly see A-Gu’s point. Tsai isn’t a great speaker, and probably will never be. She’s the chamber musician of Taiwanese politics, and when an exclamation mark is put to one of her lines, I rarely feel that the exclamation mark does really belong there.

If she gets the DPP nomination, it will be an experiment – but a worthwile one. Her voice will be heard – that much has been proven by the past three years. And the people of Taiwan (just as voters everywhere) deserve, every now and then, the opportunity to elect a politician who puts sobriety before pathos – a leader who refuses to let politics degenerate into a culture of sermons to be listened to on Sundays, and to be neglected from Mondays through Saturdays. Tsai’s nomination would be a democratic experience the world could draw lessons from, either way – it would be a Taiwanese lesson for its peer democracies.

As for questions about the substance of their policies, the challenges will be the same for both Tsai, or Su. Both will have to explain if they intend to scrap ECFA, or if they will keep it. Both of them will have to go into more detail about their presidential plans.

The public will make sure that they both will go into detail. The real choice between the two will actually be about their democratic practice – about how they will deal with the role of the sovereign – the Taiwanese people – in politics.

Echo Taiwan is pointing out another important factor – that of the intellectuals (without using that problematic term, of course, given that he’s a Tsai Ing-wen supporter himself):

Even before Tsai expressed her intent, there are groups of different stances formally expressed their endorsement on Tsai: domestic and oversea scholars and researchers, WUFI, students and The Formosan Statehood Movement. I haven’t seen any group come out to endorse Su.

To be a politician who is initially loved by bystanders is nice – but it is those who are committed to politics who will have a defining role in the formation of public opinion. They are also those who are most likely to mobilize the volunteers whose role Tsai mentioned in an earlier speech, on November 27 last year. It will be committed people and organizations who will communicate with the “ordinary people”, and who will convince them that their voices need to make the difference in 2012.

It would be an experiment – and to see something of its kind through will exact courage. Let’s see if the next generation will be proud, rather than anxious – “這個國家必須讓下一代感到驕傲，而不是焦慮.“

____________

NPC Press Conference: not so Straight to the Bank

15th press conference during the 4th Plenary Session of the 11th National People’s Congress, March 11, 2011, 10:45, held at a multi-function room of the NPC’s news center’s media center (梅地亚中心).

[Main Link: Enorth, March 11, 2011]
[All links within the quoted questions and answers underneath have been added during translation. The following are excerpts, and no translation of the entire account by Xinhua / Chinese government website / Enorth.
-- JR]

Zhou Xiaochuan (周小川), People’s Bank of China’s (PBoC) governor;
Hu Xiaolian (胡晓炼), People’s Bank of China’s deputy governor;
Liu Shiyu (刘士余), People’s Bank of China’s deputy governor;
Yi Gang (易纲), People’s Bank of China’s deputy governor and head of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange [this should include China's foreign exchange reserves] were taking questions.

Zhu Shouchen (祝寿臣) chaired the press conference,  introduced the four guests from the PBoC, and continued as follows:

This press conference doesn’t provide English translation, please ask your questions in Chinese. Foreign journalists who don’t speak Chinese can also ask their questions in English. Please state your media organization when asking a question. Please start to ask your questions.
本场记者会不提供英文翻译，请用汉语提问。不懂汉语的外国记者，也可以用英文提问。每位记者提问时请报一下媒体名称。现在开始提问。

CCTV and China Internet Television reporter (中央电视台和中国网络电视台记者):

Governor Zhou, current inflation pressures are quite high, and society is expecting increasing interest rate channels ([利]息通道 / 利率通道). But increasing interest rates will also cause an increase in hot money. How will the central bank balance the two difficult questions of exchange rates and interest rates? Another number released today says that the CPI reached 4.9 percent in February, which was basically stable compared with January. Will there be a one-time big adjustment of the exchange rate as the next step against inflation? Thank you.

Zhou:

After the successful national response to the global economic crisis, inflation increased, and under such circumstances, interest rate policies are an essential tool. Any tool of financial policies can have a negative impact, as you have mentioned, as it may lead to more capital inflows. But as you may also all know, China’s capital market hasn’t yet been entirely liberalized, but it is still controlled. We therefore have some tools to manage capital flows. As is also known, there are countries which have no capital market controls, but under these circumstances, monetary policy has to weigh the advantages and disadvantages (进行利弊权衡), and if, after comparing them, the advantages outweigh the disadvantages, such tools will have to be used. Currently, applying the interest-rate policy is a central and essential tool.
Your second question touches on the CPI. China is a very large economy, with a big population, and with a big scale. We therefore say that although the exchange rate has a certain effect on domestic prices, but proportional to the rather small liberalized economy, this effect isn’t really big. So, among the most important tools against inflation, there is no particular focus on tools related to foreign exchange rates, given that there are still other tools. I therefore believe that our exchange-rate policy and interest-rate policy must adhere to the “three characteristics” (三性)1) of which one is gradual (渐进性),  which is to say that we can adhere to a gradual approach in reforming the foreign exchange-rate, and strengthen the exchange-rate’s flexibility.

In a reply to a Phoenix TV (凤凰卫视, Hong Kong) reporter, who asked if, given that inflation or CPI shad still exceeded market expectations (as pointed out in some recent news coverage in February, on January’s CPI, too), Zhou said:

Inflation expectations, I believe, are now generally in a stable condition. That’s to say, when we look at the CPIs of December, January, and February, although they still move at a high level, inflation expectations are now relatively stable. As the central bank has said, we have never ruled out the use of any tool, and that in accordance with the actual economic situation [at at time], control of liquidity in the market may be increased.

Several questions later, replying to another  Hong Kong reporter’s question, Zhou also pointed out that most emerging markets’ CPI was clearly higher than China’s (新兴市场大国多数的CPI都比中国要明显高一些)2).

A question from a French reporter (apparently Point de Vue / 《观点》周刊) about a specific time table for making the Chinese RMB fully convertible (您能不能就人民币完全可兑换这样一个进程给出一个时间表) was answered by deputy governor Hu Xiaolian, but without a specific time table.

Asked by a China Daily (中国日报) reporter if the central bank planned to reduce the share of American treasury bonds in its foreign exchange reserves, deputy governor and head of the State Administration of Exchange Yi Gang replied that diversification had long been the central bank’s policy.

Taiwan Commercial Times (台湾工商时报) reporter:

Through continuous efforts of both sides, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have signed the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). Is there a chance that the two sides will implement a monetary settlement system? Would Fujian Xihai Economic Zone make first tests in this regard? According to your point of view, in which fields should the two sides of the Taiwan Strait’s financial businesses develop their cooperation first of all? Thank you. (通过两岸不断努力，稍早前两岸终于签订了金融贸易ECFA协议，近年内两岸有没有可能实施货币清算机制的启动？福建海西经济区会不会在这方面先试先行？依据你们的观点，今年两岸金融业务的开展应该从哪几方面开始优先合作？谢谢.)

Zhou replied with a barrage of good-atmosphere platitudes, ending both his two answers with the more-and-more formula (越来越多), and was assisted with another more-and-more slipslop by his deputy Yi Gang.

A reporter with the Portuguese News Agency (LUSA) was assured that China had confidence in the Euro area, even if the People’s Bank of China  wouldn’t make specific announcements about how many bonds would be bought on which kinds of occasions.

Zhejiang Satellite TV (浙江卫视记者) reporter:

As for our province, Zhejiang, small and medium-sized companies (SMEs, 中小企业) are depending on bank capital, but bank financing is currently very tight. Banks can easily raise interest rates, and the SMEs have absolutely no bargaining power and can be easily harmed. May I ask Governor Zhou how, under a tightening policy, harm for the SMEs can be avoided? Thank you. (拿我们浙江来说，中小企业对银行资金较为依赖，现在的情况是资金很紧张，银行就会顺势抬高贷款利率，中小企业根本就没有议价能力，很容易受伤，请问周行长在紧缩政策下怎么样避免不伤及中小企业？谢谢。)

Zhou:

Since last year, SMEs loans share has risen strongly. In the past, within the bank loans granted, the big companies’ share was quite big, and there were somewhat few SMEs, and their share was comparatively small. With last year’s “three-tiered system”, the loan amounts to big, medium-sized, and small companies were basically the same, each of them with a share of about one-third, which is a good sign.
去年以来，中小企业的贷款比重有大幅度提高，过去在银行贷款汇总数据里面，大企业占的比重相当大，中等企业少一点，小企业比例比较小。去年实现了 “三三制”，银行体系总的对企业贷款里，大型企业、中型企业、小型企业三个组别贷款总量基本差不多，各占三分之一，这是一个好的现象。

As for the situation under the macro-economic changes, with monetary policies being switched from moderately loose to a firm one, capital prices have to rise – that is normal. Big, medium-sized and small companies may all have to shoulder rising interest rates, which is inevitable. Small companies’ increases in capital costs may be slanted into the direction of costs rising more strongly, which can be worked on from two directions. One is to encourage commercial banks to take more care of small businesses, and to further consolidate and develop small companies’ loans. Many commercial banks are aware of this.
至于说在宏观形势变化的情况下，货币政策从适度宽松转为稳健以后，资金价格会有所上升，这是正常的，大中小企业可能都要承受上升的利率，这是必然的。有可能在这种环境下，小企业承受的上升幅度可能会偏高，这可以从两个方面做工作，一是继续鼓励商业银行更多地关照小企业，进一步巩固和发展小企业贷款。很多商业银行也都是有这方面的意识的。

On the other hand, commercial banks must be required to show better abilities in their pricing. Actually, under different economic circumstances, a bank may price its loans according to the risks at the company in question, and reward those with better repayment abilities, and lower risks – and vice versa -, so that the companies will feel that they are treated impartially. We also encourage small companies to choose from the market. Different banks may show different attitudes towards you, may have different opinions about you, and will also price loans differently – this requires choices.
另一方面，要求商业银行有更好的定价能力。确实，在经济条件不一样的情况下，银行会根据企业的具体情况进行有区别的风险定价，对偿还能力比较好的、风险比较低的企业，在定价方面应当与那些风险比较高的企业加以区别，这样使得小企业感到有更加公平的待遇。再一条，我们也鼓励小企业也要在市场上有所选择。不同的银行，可能对你的态度不一样，对你的看法不一样，给你的价格也不一样，这个要有所选择。

As the central bank, we mainly do one thing – to let our credit information system include more SME numbers. All SMEs with a loan history have been included in our credit information system, which can provide commercial banks with data of all kinds, help them to understand the company’s loan situation, and price loans based on that information, including risk premiums. The resulting better accuracy can benefit SMEs. Of course, Chinese SMEs do differ from each other, and can’t be judged across the board. Thank you all.
从中央银行的角度来讲，我们主要做的一件事，就是使我们的征信系统更多地包含中小企业的数字。现在基本上凡是有贷款历史记录的中小企业都已经纳入了征信体系，征信体系可以给商业银行提供更多的各方面的数据，使得他们能够了解企业的资信情况，从而使他们的定价，包括风险定价，都能够更为准确，这样有利于中小企业。当然，对中小企业应该也是有区别的，不是“一刀切”的。谢谢大家。

____________

Notes

¹⁾ sān xìng (三性, three characteristics) is also a religious term, about good, bad, and neutral seeds, or about the three types of character – good (善性), bad (恶性), and neutral (无记性).

²⁾ For some background concerning Beijing’s computation of the consumer price index (CPI), please read The Emperor’s new Thermometer (February 16), and Seasonal Considerations (February 19).

____________

Related
The Government’s Macroeconomic Controls, July 1, 2010
“Using” the Credit Squeeze”, January 18, 2010

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Q & A: All Very Stable

China’s inflation and industrial production exceeded forecasts in February, underscoring the challenge for Premier Wen Jiabao as he seeks to prevent price increases from stirring social unrest,

Bloomberg reports.

Both China Central Bank’s (People’s Bank of China) governor Zhou Xiaochuan and a CCTV reporter asking Zhou a question on today’s 15th press conference during the 4th Plenary Session of the 11th National People’s Congress seemed to take a much more sanguine view.

Another number released today says that the CPI (consumer price index) reached 4.9 percent in February, which is basically stable compared with January, the CCTV newsman suggested in his question, which was actually about if a one-time big adjustment in exchange-rate reforms (i. e. a major appreciation of China’s currency) was to be expected.

And answering a Phoenix TV reporter’s question after CCTV’s, it was then Zhou himself who suggested that while the December, January and February levels had been quite high, inflation expectations were now comparatively stable, after all (如果我们观察12月、1月、2月CPI的数字，虽然还是在高位运行，但是通货膨胀预期目前相对比较平稳).

The way the CPI has been calculated since the beginning of this year had been debated – and questioned – in February.