Archive for June, 2009

Tuesday, June 16, 2009

Iran: One Generation Further

JR is neither Iranian, nor religious. His view of what is going on in Iran is the view of a mere bystander.

Mir-Hossein Mousavi, the leading opposition contender in Iran’s presidential election, has cancelled a rally planned for later today yesterday. He is thought to be reformist, but he is loyal to the regime. Now, millions of Iranians are waiting for the election re-count, announced by the Guardian Council.

Iran’s pious regime is still around, and may be around for some years to come. It won’t necessarily “go with a bang”. But during the past few days, Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei‘s authority has started to erode, and so has the authority of all leading clerics who believed that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president would be best for the stability of the clerical oligarchy‘s rule. If the regime survives for now, it will also be because Khamenei – apparently anyway – understands that he can’t simply sweep allegations of election fraud under the carpet. But whatever decisions he may take, the regime he stands for has become dented, for all the world to see. The dents aren’t really new. They were incurred long ago. The system that rules Iran has prescribed them from the beginning, in 1979.

Those who accuse Ahmadinejad’s government of fraud haven’t presented clear evidence yet – there is some evidence, argues Der Spiegel, but nothing irrefutable. If the re-count ordered by the Guardian Council, will be impartial isn’t clear either.

While the damage to the regime is becoming evident, the will of the people is not – at least n0t yet. It is still buried under public distrust from both the Ahmadinejad and the Mousavi camp, and the will of the people is split, no matter who carried the most votes. Either for the medium or for the immediate term, there is only one way out for Iran’s elite: to establish a transparent process which will produce an election process ( either by re-counting, or by a re-run) in which people can believe. To agree to such a process won’t be easy, as many of the real leaders (Ahmadinejad is hardly one of them) are deeply at odds with each other. But all further doubts would lead to the killings of more Iranians, and every Iranian killed in this struggle, be it in broad daylight or in the obscurity of the country’s police stations and jails,  will disrepute the regime further.

In the long run, a regime that wants to base the daily lives of more than 70 million Iranians on the ideas of just one man is bound to fail. Any government under the auspices of the “Islamic Revolution”, orthodox or reformist, is bound to fail. Iran, a country that would have all the makings of a success story, is busy with spilling blood, and with wasting the lifetimes of its people. The ways of the world – and a nation which wants to prosper – can’t be squeezed into the framework of just one philosophy or religion.

Last time when hundreds of thousands (if not millions) of Iranians turned to the streets was thirty years ago. Many of the demonstrators back then probably didn’t want a theocracy – they only felt that Iran was in a dead end, and that their situation was unsustainable. Almost any kind of change was welcome.

So it is now. The current demonstrations may die out with the re-count, or be brutally quelled – or they may succeed. But whatever their immediate outcome will be, they have already begun to change Iran.

Monday, June 15, 2009

Nanjing University Survey: Little Desire for Positions as Head Teacher

Seven out of ten teachers do not want to work as head teachers in several regions, according to a survey conducted by researchers from Jiangsu Province in various regions. Huang Zhengping (黄正平), associate research fellow at Jiangsu Province Institute of Science and Technology Education (江苏省教育科学研究院), Qi Xuehong (齐学红), director of a educational research center at Nanjing Normal University (南京师范大学班主任研究中心) and others discussed the findings on the Pudong Education Forum under the theme of “In the modernization process of establishing a science of teacher professionalism”.

The forum found that the workload of headteachers was heavy, the pressure high, head teachers were met with little respect, and that there was only little occupational well-being in the job. It was pointed out that more than four million teachers in China served as head teachers, and that their well-being was essential for the students’ well-being.

A nation-wide survey of teachers is no small thing. Teaching isn’t necessarily easy in Beijing. And in a very different setting, it’s not necessarily easy in the countryside either.

Sunday, June 14, 2009

Australia: Cardboard Talk and Protectionism?

The Daily Telegraph can reveal that all NSW Government departments and agencies will be forced to protect Australian jobs by giving preference to locally made products.
This would include stationery, uniforms, cars and even trains and building contracts. And to make local bids more competitive, a 20 per cent discount will be applied to Australian products when comparing the cost with overseas bidders.
Almost $4 bn worth, Daily Telegraph, June 15 (local time)

One reason the Government is having so much difficulty selling its message of non-discrimination is that the foreign investment review process in Canberra is about as transparent as it is in Beijing, without the bribery.
John Garnaut, The Age, June 15 (local time)

Related: Chinalco – Shopping on the Commodity Market, Febr 19

Sunday, June 14, 2009

Academics: Five Obstacles for “Green Dam”

Much of the following is based on my translation – which is hardly flawless. No good for legal use – this is a layman’s post. If you want to save the money on an expert’s translation, it will be your problem.

Chinese “web filtering software” Green Dam and Minor Escort (绿坝-花季护航) – to be mandatorily included on every personal computer sold from or after July 1 – contains serious security vulnerabilities, according to three computer scientists with the University of Michigan.

“If Green Dam is deployed in its current form, it will significantly weaken China’s computer security,” the report states. “While the flaws we discovered can be quickly patched, correcting all the problems in the Green Dam software will likely require extensive rewriting and thorough testing. This will be difficult to achieve before China’s July 1 deadline for deploying Green Dam nationwide.”

Shanghai’s Xin Min Evening News (新民晚报) reports that Profs Zhou Ze (周泽), a lawyer with China Youth University for Political Sciences in Beijing (中国青年政治学院), and Wei Yongzheng (魏永征, probably often pronounced in a Cantonese way, as Wei is from Hong Kong) have applied to the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, for information disclosure and for a hearing.

The ministry is not responsible for the regulation of content for the media industry, according to Wikipedia of today, as this is the task of the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television, and the General Administration of Press and Publication. However, it is in charge of stipulating laws and regulations of the manufacturing industry of electronic and IT products, the communications industry and the software industry (2.), and to handle other matters entrusted by the State Council (16.).

Zhou’s and Wei’s case is not about contents, but about legality: they believe that the ministry’s notice of prior installation of internet filtering software on computers of June 9 violates several laws, among them the anti-monopoly law. All in all, their analysis spells out five legal obstacles for the software.

One is that the plan violates the Anti Unfair Competition Law. Zhou and Wei refer to its article 7:

The government and its organ shall not abuse its authority to force the others to purchase the commodities from the pointed seller or prohibit the fair competition from the others. The government and its organ shall not abuse its authority to prohibit outside commodities from going into home market, or prohibit domestic commodities from going to outside market.

The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology requires manufacturers of personal computers to install the Green Dam software before the pc’s leave their factories. According to their analysis, there are only two licensors for the software: Zhengzhou Jinhui Computer Systems Engineering Co Ltd  (郑州金惠计算机系统工程有限公司) and Beijing Da Zheng Language and Knowledge Handling Technology Co Ltd (北京大正语言知识处理科技有限公司). While the state pledges to pay the license fees during the first year, there is no information as to who will pay the fees for the following years. If it is the consumer who pays, it could constitute a violation of article 7, write Zhou and Wei.

Another obstacle is that the ministry’s note violates several Anti-Monopoly Law articles.

Article 8: No administrative organ or organization empowered by a law or administrative regulation to administer public affairs may abuse its administrative powers to eliminate or restrict competition.

Article 32: Any administrative organ or organization empowered by a law or administrative regulation to administer public affairs may not abuse its administrative power, restrict or restrict in a disguised form entities and individuals to operate, purchase or use the commodities provided by business operators designated by it.

Article 37: Any administrative organ may not abuse its administrative power to set down such provisions in respect of eliminating or restricting competition.

Zhou and Wei argue that other softwares than of the two companies chosen by the ministry can offer similar functions as Green Dam – this would even include Microsoft Vista.

Their analysis also refers to the Product Quality Law. The state stipulates certain quality standards, which do not include Green Dam software. There was no legal base to enforce features outside the product quality law.

Then there is the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Protection of Consumer Rights and Interests.

Article 9: Consumers shall enjoy the right of free choice of commodities services.
Consumers shall have the right to make a free choice of business operats f supply of commodities services, freely among varieties of articles fms of services and decide independently to buy not to buy any kind of commodities, to accept not to accept any item of services.
Consumers shall have the right to make comparisons, differentiations and ions when they make a free choice of commodities services.

As Green Dam software is a product, the consumers have the right to make a free choice of commodities or services, i.e. similar software from other manufacturers than those of Green Dam.

And the procedure also is against the General Principles of Civil Law, and the principles of Contract Law. Article 3 of the General principles of Civil Law states that “Parties to a civil activity shall have equal status”, while Contract Law’s article 3 stipulates that “The parties to contract shall have equal legal status. No party may impose its will on the other party”.

Zhou and Wei also object to the term “bad information” (不良信息), which isn’t specific.

The filter software is “anti-porn”, says Xinhua. Maybe the Chinese government decided that in the current phase of social development, this latest censorship step needed a particularly subtle approach.

But Xinhua, I must say that you are treading a fine line here.

Saturday, June 13, 2009

Confucianism and Modernity (3)

Some remarks: The following post describes four categories of mainland Chinese Confucians. It’s a continuation of translating an essay by Wang Zhicheng (王志成) of May this year.

With the second of the four categories, Prof Wang introduces Chinese Confucian scholar Jiang Qing (蒋庆). Jiang Qing claims that Confucianism – as a religion, not as a school – dates back to the times of the Fu Hsi trigrams. That’s to say, the trigrams are attributed to Fu Hsi, the first mythical emperor of China, and Jiang believes that the roots of Confucianism are at least as old as Fu Hsi.

Fu Hsi and his wife – or sister – Nü Kua both created or maintained civilization, if not the world, according to Chinese mythology. There is no evidence that the legendary imperial couple really existed, but they are often referred to, as if they had been real for sure (maybe in the same way as many religions believe that there is a God, and base everything on this belief).

Either way, it’s worth remembering that China’s civilization didn’t only start evolving when Qin Shihuang “unified China” for the first time in its history. Qin is said to have referred back to Fu Hsi, when claiming the glory of having reestablished Fu Hsi’s correct principles of keeping the genders apart – keeping the men tilling the fields and the women taking care of their homes. French sinologist (and sociologist) Marcel Granet mentions Qin Shihuang’s reference to Fu Hsi. Granet’s Chinese Civilization (La Civilization Chinoise, Paris 1929, 1968 / Die Chinesische Zivilisation, München 1968, subtitle: from the beginnings until the imperial times) looks into China’s pre-imperial history is sometimes contested, as it is allegedly not always clear what is translation from the old sources, and what is Granet’s own comment. But even if so, Granet can make us aware of the history which, as Jiang Qing puts it, is “older than Confucian school” – but not older than Confucian religion. If those times were really Confucian, as Jiang would have it, or if Jiang “confucianizes” them ex-post, is probably a different question.

Anyway, the following is another bit of translation of Wang Zhicheng‘s (王志成) essay. Please mind the likely flaws of my translation (including part 1 and part 2 of it)…

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The Confucian “sage-king’s” ways took the nature of daily life, thrown onto the stage of the stage of pluralism by Prof Tu. As for cultural modernization, making Confucianism part of everyone’s daily life and looking at it as something local offer no fundamental solution. Looking at it from a calm cultural position, Confucianism still remains in its modern difficult situation.

Contemporary Categories of Mainland Chinese Confucians

In the wake of Western “cultural hegemonism” and China’s rapid political, economic, and diplomatic development, all kinds of civilizations increasingly moved to the epochal fore. In new difficult situations, people needed to reestablish their cultural self-confidence and find their own cultural identity. Confucianism appeared in various forms and presented a pluralistic situation. Basically, there seem to be the following kinds of new-generation Confucians.

First Category

The first category is the Confucian Panda theory, represented by Beijing University’s (Bei Da) Prof Zhang Xianglong (张祥龙). In 2001, in the Modern Education Journal (现代教育报, July 20 B1), he presented the idea of a protection zone for Confucian culture. This idea led to a big debate. According to Prof Zhang, Confucianism, under the current difficult situation, had no ability to continue to exist by itself. Without protection, it would vanish. From a perspective of cultural species diversity, there was an absolute need for a protection of Confucian culture, just as there was a need to protect the pandas. In his article “What is the meaning of establishing Confucian Culture Protection Zones”, published in 2007, Prof Zhang offered a concise but systematic plan. He said that we must give Confucianism a minimum chance to survive, to let this valuable cultural species live on. In view of this, he described his plan for a protection zone in detail, with four perequisites:
1. A certain territorial size, just as pandas needed a big territory with bamboo forests.
2. A certain population size.
3. Quarantined protection without influence from outside.
4. Common life, organized in accordance with Confucian principles.
To those who advocated that Confucianism should see a comprehensive revival and play a growing role in society, this radical plan amounted to an insult against Confucianism. And to those who advocated comprehensive westernization, it looked useless.

Second Category

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Another remark about this category: There are two terms at the center of these paragraphs about Jiang Qing’s doctrine: “Confucian School” (儒学, ru xue) and “Confucian Religion” (儒教, ru jiao). jiao is the usual Chinese word for religion. But it doesn’t refer to religious beliefs as strictly as it does in English. jiao may also refer to teaching in general. I’ve translated ruxue with Confucianism, and rujiao with Confucian religion in these paragraphs. –JR
_______

The second category is the gongyang theory [公羊论]*) . It’s represented by Jiang Qing (蒋庆) of the Yangming Jinshe Academy (阳明精舍, near Guiyang). Jiang advocates the Outer King doctrine. [This is quite the opposite of Yu Yingshi's idea that Confucianism should no longer have a direct link with the workings of the outer king, i.e. the institutions of the state - see part 1, May 30.] Jiang strongly advocates establishing a new outer king and to politicize Confucianism on this foundation, thus putting it into a position to counter Western cultural, political and religious systems. In his article “Political Confucianism”, Jiang Qing strongly criticizes contemporary New Confucianism, saying that its greatest danger is its inability to bring about a new outer king. Jiang Qing believes that Confucianism is not a school [ruxue, Confucianism], but by its character culturally unique – a self-sufficient civilizational system. The Confucian school is a religious doctrinal system, the source of its values are the classical Confucian works. “Confucian religion’s [rujiao, Confucian religion] history is older than the Confucian school; the Xia, Shang and Zhou dynasties had Confucian religion. Strictly speaking, even at the age of the Fu Xi trigrams or hexagrams (伏羲时代), Confucian religion already existed. As Confucian religion is a civilizational system, Fuixi hexagrams already founded Chinese civilization. Besides, “Sage and King are One” (圣王合一), “Politics and Religion are One” (政教合一), Confucian Orthodoxy and Political System are One” (道统政统合一) are characteristics of Confucian religion itself, and goals pursued by Confucianism.

At the times of the Chunqiu, the Warring States, Emperor Qin, and the Han Dynasties, Confucian religion withdrew from the center to the sidelines of Chinese cultural power. After Han Wudi solely respected Confucian methods, the Confucian school returned to the cultural power center, rose to become Confucian religion again, and remained in that position right until it collapsed in 1911 and withdrew to the sidelines again, and dropped to the status of Confucian school again.”

Jiang Qing understands Western culture very well. It’s for his own cultural identity and reflections on Chinese Confucianism that he believes that Chinese Confucian religious civilization is what really establishes the sources of Chinese identity. He therefore says that “facing the current comprehensive Western challenge requires a comprehensive revival of Confucian religion. Only by reacting to Western civilization with Confucian religious civilization, can we achieve a comprehensive revival of Chinese culture. ….. If we leave the reconstruction of Confucian religion and rather address the reconstruction of Confucianism [ruxue], we will have given up the efforts for a comprehensive revival of Chinese culture and will have allowed Chinese civilization to drop to a status of a school of thought (思想学派, sixiang xuepai) which engages in dialog with Western civilization. It would be the self-dismissal (自我贬黜, ziwo bianchu) of Chinese culture. Therefore, reviving Confucian religion is the task of our times, to revive China’s culture and to rebuild China’s civilization.”

There are more and more people who want to politicize and institutionalize Confucian religious civilization, with the final goal of having it compete with the influence of Western civilization.
Prof Chen Ming (
陈明) of Capital Normal University (首都师范大学), Prof Wang Dasan (王达三) of People’s University’s Confucius Studies Institute (中国人民大学孔子研究院), Prof Peng Yongjie (彭永捷) of People”s University”s Philosophy Institute and others all call for the revival and institutionalization of Confucian religion.

The path to an institutionalized Confucianism may be Utopian, because a nostalgic desired situation can only be significant when it is in step with the progressing times, and in that it is put into practise. There are no indicators yet by which to judge the success of putting the institutionalization of Confucianism into practise.

Third Category

The third category can be seen as Bird’s Perspective Confucian theory. It analyzes and assesses Confucianism from a Marxist position. People who stand for this category are Prof Fang Litian (方立天) and Prof Tang Yijie (汤一介). This is one kind of purely scientific research which conducts rational analysis of Confucianism and contemporary New Confucianism and distinguishes their rights and wrongs according to the Marxist position, and forecasts their prospects. It doesn’t promote a Confucian movement itself.

Fourth Category

Currently, there is also a fourth category, which can be called “New Confucianism’s Third Period. It develops along the development direction of contemporary New Confucianism by Tu Weiming, Liu Shuxian et al. This field has a young representative, Tsinghua University’s Prof Peng Guoxiang (彭国翔). In 2007, Prof Peng published his essay collection “Confucianism’s Tradition: Between Religion and Humanism”. In this book, Confucianism is assigned a role both as a humanistic and a religious tradition, which can continue to have an effect on the world today.

Using words from Ou Yang Jing Wu (欧阳竞无) and Fang Dongmei (方东美), Peng Guoxiang defends the title of his book saying that “Confucianism isn’t humanism and isn’t religion, but is humanism and religion.”
On the one hand, in some sense, Prof Peng sees Confucianism as some kind of humanism, but one which isn’t the same as conventional humanism, because there is a transcending aspect to it. On the other hand, Prof Peng sees Confucianism as some kind of religious tradition, but again, not in the same way as Western Jewish or Christian religion. Therefore, he locates Confucianism between humanism and religion. From today’s’ perspective, this looks reasonable.

Peng Guoxiang has his own explanation for the unfolding of the Third Period of Confucianism. He remembers the threads of this Third Period, examines Tu Weiming’s development of it, and points out how the things Prof Tu said about the Third Period already emphasized the globalized character of Confucianism’s development. The core of Confucianism’s development is no longer Confucian tradition in China, how to transform and revive it, but how it should enter the world outside the Chinese world, and how to enter into a dialog with other civilizations, represented by the West.
Seen from Confucianism’s area of influence, Confucianism’s first period happened on Chinese soil itself; the second period’s influence extended to Korea, Japan, Vietnam, and other countries, and the Third Period’s Confucianism went to the world. Peng Guoxiang believes that Tu Weiming’s late phase of the Third Period shows two fundamental essential points: the first is how confucianism can make itself go to the world rather than confining itself to China or even just to East Asian civilization; and following that, the core task of Confucianism’s Third period definitely is the dialog of civilizations.

Peng Guoxiang apparently wants to promote Third Period theory within Confucianism. He says that Confucianism’s Third Period’s true significance is that “one shouldn’t see a tradition that much in the light of its significance within its own place, but as how it enriches its own significance in its own place through dialog with other civilizations.”

The dialog of civilizations needs to become an important content of Confucianism’s Third Period development. But Peng Guoxiang doesn’t accept that Confucianism should “arrange all worldly matters” [see part 1, May 30]. He says: “These days, no matter if within China or elsewhere, Confucianism can only be considered a religious system of values, and can only play a role with methods of faith, but it can’t present itself as a kind of comprehensive arrangement of worldly matters.”

Peng Guoxiang understands Confucianism as a religion in a broader sense, i. e. as a justification (理一), and considers all kinds of religions particular in their own ways (把各个宗教视为“分殊”). Therefore, as he sees it, Confucianism corresponds with the requirements for religion, which doesn’t need to fit into the pattern of Abraham’s religions. Besides, he believes, it has become an uncontested fact that Confucianism can be seen as a religious tradition and as an intellectual tradition. Until today, representational dialog between Confucianism and Christianity have taken place five times.

Peng Guoxiang believes that Confucianism has always had a strong tradition of dialog. By its very nature, it developed through dialog. During the first period of Confucianism’s development, the classical Lunyu (论语) basically took the form of dialog between Confucius and his disciples. From the Tang and Song to the Ming and Qing Dynasties, Confucianism developed a civilizational dialog process more of its own. Through dialog, Confucianism developed li xue (The School of Principle, 理学), entered Korea and Japan, brought out Zhu Zi’s (Zhu Xi, 朱子学) and Yang Ming’s (阳明学) teachings respectively. From the end of the Qing Dynasty until today, Confucianism has also had a strong sense of dialog. With Yu Yingshi [see part 1, May 30], Cheng Zhongying, Tu Weiming [see part 2, June 6] and other scholars, dialog will enter a still higher level. Prof Peng Guoxiang wants to promote Confucianism’s spirit of dialog along their path. He points out that firstly, it is “the principle of dialog with the different” (和而不同), and secondly, it is the pluralistic religious view of “justification [or rationale] and particulars” (理一分殊), and thirdly, it is a plurality of religions becoming part of a theoretical and practical resource with a pluralistic religious identity.

From the pessimistic Confucian Panda Protection Zone to the New gongyang theory’s passionate doctrine of a new outer king, from the Bird’s Perspective based on Marxism to the Third Period Confucianism going to the world and participating in dialog, Confucian scholars reflect on Confucianism’s chances to exist in our times. They are seeking a well-founded plan, they are mapping out Confucianism’s revival and glory, for taking part in the process of global civilization. Their spirit of thorough inquiry deserves respect, their diverse grace is touching, their strength intimidates all under heaven. But does Confucianism have a chance of modern development?

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*) gongyang, referring to a Confucian commentary tradition. gongyang could mean “ram” (a male sheep), but it rather seems to refer to a (probably fictional) commenter (“Mr Gongyang”), which or who stands for an approach of editing the Spring and Autumn Annals. This is how Nakajima Takahiro of the University of Tokyo describes the current use of the old gongyang commentary by Jiang Qing:
Thinking of the reestablishment of the legitimacy of Chinese government as the first priority, Jiang Qing [...] confirms the need to put a political system into place, supporting the state based on Confucianism, as the Western democratic system is not sufficient for this purpose. Jiang demands a three-chamber system, divided into a people’s chamber which represents the will of the people, a national chamber, representing the historic and cultural legitimacy, and a Confucian chamber, embodying the Confucian values. The two former inherit from the traditional house of representatives and the upper house, the Confucian chamber, in a more pristine way, expresses the divine, transcendent legitimacy – Confucianism thus takes the rank of a constitution. Often seen as “Confucian fundamentalism”, Gan Chunsong judges it differently, saying that Jiang Qing’s argumentation isn’t based on the Confucian classics, but contents itself with omitting and combining elements [in a way that] they can help to solve existing problems. This would be in accordance with the gongyang commentary, thus adopting the interpretational style which had been reestablished by Kang Youwei.
[More on Kang Youwei's approach can also be found here, page 2.]
– translated from Religion et sécularisation en Chine, pour un confucianisme critique, Nakajima Takahiro, page 87

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Update: continued here.

Saturday, June 13, 2009

Nationalists and Sages

Jungle War

Jungle War

Hello Children,

today, I’m going to let you know the difference between Nationalists and Sages. When an Indian applauds the tough posture of his government, he’s a nationalist, supporting his government’s unwise moves.

If you are Chinese and think that India is going to invade you soon, you are a sage.

Got to fly and save the motherland. Stay sage and patriotic, support my good cause, and send me some cigarettes to sustain me in the jungle.

Shikezhunbeizhe!

Friday, June 12, 2009

End of the Future

German governments are usually formed by more than one political party. While negotiating the policies of their four-year term, they also produce a slogan, quite similar to the old Chinese emperors. The current grand coalition took the motto “Mut und Menschlichkeit” (courage and humaneness) in 2005. Some newly-elected federal government will choose another one, late this year.

“Mut zur Zukunft” – trust in the future – was the headline of a social democratic and liberal parties’ coalition government program in 1980. About the same time, some of my classmates wore jackets sporting a more popular slogan – no future. Others sprayed the words on the walls in town.

I’m wondering if anyone, except some die-hard punks, would do that today. I haven’t seen that happen for a long time. But it could hardly fit better than now. Take a look on a group of elementary school students on a school trip. All the mobile phones are out and in action. “Can you send me that squirrel on drugs?” – “sure” – “That went fast! Do you want the mad customer on the hotline?” – “yeah.”

On, and on, and on, for hours. I’m wondering if they are using a flatrate. No books. No game of chess. No past. No history. Only a digital desert here, and small heads full of crap. Many of their parents must be struggling to afford these gadgets to their offspring. No child left behind – it might become an outsider without state-of-the-art tech. God forbid.

I know – every generation ever since the old Greeks have predicted the end of the world, or at least of civilization. But you see, JR isn’t doing that at all. He’s not repeating history. He’s only predicting the end of the future.

Sure, most of these kids, so they’ll live, do have a future. But once the future will be here, it will be the present tense. Future is about ideas, plans, and expectations. Many young people have no plans. They make no plans. They only have their here and now. If some kind of future dawns on them, something which is no stuff of dreams, but something about real life, it makes them feel uneasy, and they turn away from it. And after all, how could they be positively curious about the future, when their parents’ fear of it is palpable? Children pick up such signals very quickly.

When my classmates wore their no-future stickers, they weren’t too positive about the future either. But they were aware of the future. Most of us, no matter if we liked the slogan or not, understood that we should embrace the future, and make the best of it.

Most of our parents and teachers were usually quite helpful. Not because they were so much brighter than us, but rather, because they usually avoided overextending themselves. They didn’t take our spleens too serious. They didn’t try to “understand” us all the time. Seeing the relationship between generations today – I’ve heard several teenage girls say that their mothers are their best friends – makes me feel grateful for the hard-headedness and realism of our parents. Parents and teachers might be role models in certain ways – and often, rather at hindsight, than during childhood itself. But I won’t believe for a moment that there are no serious tensions between the generations. Mothers and daughters, fathers and sons who say otherwise, are only in denial – or they are potted plants walking. So are teachers who think they can be their students’ friends. This could only work if there was no change, from one generation to the next. But the fact is that the world has never changed as fast, as it is doing now. If people refuse to fight about it [update: the future], they refuse to go with the times.

Most of the people I know from schooldays would have felt embarrassed, if our elders had tried to make friends with us. We would have sensed the fabrication.

It can’t be easy to be a child these days.

Wednesday, June 10, 2009

Qin Gang and Hermit oppose Dalai Lama’s Latest Honorary Citizenship…

Stunt jackal

Stunt jackal takes advantage of inconsistencies

that one from Paris. But any other honorary citizenship for that jackal too, of course. But as only Mr Qin, a government spokesman in Beijing, is paid for his statements, Hermit would like to economize on his time and refer you to an old keynote interview of hisself where he said it all before.

Besides, the honorary citizenship for the Dalai Lama is also very unscientific, Chinese experts say. It’s a stunt and wouldn’t have happened if there wasn’t a big inconsistency between national and municipal matters in France.

P.S.: This post links to Xinhuanet. Hermit thinks that plurality and diversity in our use of accurate and scientific sources is very important. Over all the fuss about China Global Times, we must never forget Xinhua and China Daily.

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